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EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn*
The battle for the future of assisted reproduction technologies (ART) has been
joined.  The tacit compromise underlying assisted reproduction—no laws are passed
that even tangentially sanction embryo destruction and no laws are passed that
intrude on the profitability of fertility treatments—may be coming to an end.  As use
of ART has increased, so have calls for supervision and oversight.  In the wake of
“Octomom” Nadya Suleman’s use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) to give birth to
octuplets, the calls to regulate assisted reproduction have become even more
pressing.   President Obama’s 2009 reversal of the Bush policy on stem cell research1
has increased the importance of federal oversight of embryo donations at the same
time that those opposed to embryo destruction have stepped up efforts to preserve
the thousands of unused IVF embryos for reproductive purposes.   At the same time,2
religious communities ambivalent about ART have increased the calls to reform
ART practices to bring them more in line with religious teachings and spiritually
informed notions of human dignity.3
In this paper, we focus on what may become a new flash point in the effort to
craft normative understandings about assisted reproduction.  That flash point is the
treatment of the hundreds of thousands of extra embryos created through in vitro
fertilization (IVF).   IVF involves extracting eggs from women undergoing fertility4
treatment (or sometimes from intended donors), fertilization of the eggs in a labora-
tory, and implantation of the resulting embryos in the intended mother or a gesta-
tional surrogate.  Because the process of extracting human eggs is invasive, painful,
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585988
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See Nicholas Wade, Clinics Hold More Embryos Than Had Been Thought, N.Y. T IM ES,5
May 9, 2003, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/09/us/clinics-hold-more-
embryos -than-had-been-thought.html. For an overview of what the in vitro fertilization
process entails, see Reproductive Fertility Center, IVF Patient Overview, http://www
.reproductivefertilitycenter.com/rfc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=69&
Itemid=71 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). For further discussion of embryo issues, see NAOM I
R. CAHN , TEST TUBE FAM ILIES: WHY TH E FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION
(2009); Cahn & Collins, supra note 1, at 502–03 (discussing recent proposals to regulate the
IVF industry).
In high risk cases, the doctors may conduct preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)6
to screen the embryos for disease or other characteristics. See Fertility LifeLines, Assisted
Reproductive Technologies: Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, http://www.fertilitylifelines
.com/fertilitytreatments/pgd.jsp (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). Some parents elect to use ART
to select an embryo that carries the parents’ disorder. See Jaime King, Duty to the Unborn:
A Response to Smolensky, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 379–80 (2008).
See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.7
See id.8
See id.9
See Britney Glaser, The Fertility Dilemma: Frozen Embryos, KPLCTV, Mar. 27, 2009,10
http://www.kplctv.com/Global/story.asp?S=10081861; Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Fertility
Patients’ Views About Frozen Embryo Disposition: Results of a Multi-Institutional U.S.
Survey, 93 FERTILITY &  STERILITY 499 (2010).
See infra pp. 10–11.11
and expensive, doctors extract as many eggs as they can in each attempt.   To5
increase success rates, doctors fertilize all of the eggs, allow them to develop for
several days, and then select the healthiest (generally the most mobile) for implanta-
tion.   To manage the risk of birth defects, and the impact on both mother and child,6
doctors prefer to limit the number of embryos implanted at one time.  So state-of-
the-art IVF today routinely produces extra embryos that may never be used.7
Patients generally freeze the embryos that are not implanted so that they will be
available to produce additional children or for additional attempts if the first effort
does not succeed.   A large number of patients, however, ultimately choose not to8
use their frozen embryos, creating an issue about ultimate disposition.   The choices9
often offered are to thaw and discard the embryos, donate them for research, or
donate them for reproductive purposes.   Each of the three options would take place10
more readily, however, if the law were to clarify the legal status of embryos, the
mechanisms by which their progenitors could discard or transfer them to others, and
the obligations of third parties involved in the process.  And therein lies the rub.
The status of embryos, which involves profound religious and philosophical
differences and which has become the subject of entrenched political differences
over the course of the abortion fight, lies at the heart of these developments.  On one
side of the debate is what we term “embryo fundamentalism,” that is, the insistence
that embryos are unique human beings from the moment of the conception, and
should be respected as such.   On the other side of the debate are those who would11
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See Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Implications for12
Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 306 (2006) (outlining different views on the moral
status of embryos); Paul D. Simmons, Perspectives: Protestant, THE RELIGIOUS COALITION
FOR REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE, http://www.rcrc.org/perspectives/protestant.cfm (highlighting
Protestant perspective on reproductive issues); see also Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern
Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39 CONN. L. REV. 2107 (2007) (utilizing
postmodern critique to explore questions surrounding frozen embryo disputes).
See, e.g., Lyerly, supra note 10; Denise Grady, Parents Torn Over Extra Frozen13
Embryos From Fertility Procedures, N.Y. T IM ES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/us/04embryo.html.
See infra Part IV.14
See Lyerly, supra note 10, at 506 (“Consistent with single-site studies from Europe and15
Australia, donation for research was the most popular option for disposition of excess
embryos.”).
See id. at 500 (“[D]elayed decisions create difficulties for the providers who are16
responsible for safe storage or disposition of apparently abandoned embryos.”).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 9:125 (2009) (“An in vitro fertilized human ovum as a juridical17
person is recognized as a separate entity apart from the medical facility or clinic where it is
housed or stored.”).
Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-41 (2009); see Steven Ertelt, Georgia State House Passes18
Embryo Adoption Bill to Protect Unborn Children, LIFENEW S, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www
.lifenews.com/bio2793.html.
define the status of embryos in terms of the differing values their progenitors confer
on them.   Indeed, studies show that most of the patients who currently participate12
in IVF have multiple approaches to the meaning of the embryos they have created.13
Embryo fundamentalists, in contrast, include both some who are opposed to IVF
entirely as inconsistent with human dignity and others who might embrace ART if
the process were remade to reflect their values.
The conflicts between these groups accordingly have both symbolic and practi-
cal implications.  The symbolic clash involves an extension of the abortion fight into
the disposition of the hundreds of thousands of frozen embryos in clinic freezers.
Proposals are multiplying to permit, and in many cases encourage, their transfer for
reproductive purposes.   At the same time, surveys show a majority of IVF patients14
would like to transfer their leftover embryos for research purposes.   And the clinics15
that store them would like greater direction on their disposition, if only to avoid the
continuing storage costs for embryos unlikely to be used for other purposes.16
The symbolic clash addresses embryo status and the issue of whether the state
should treat embryos as human life from the moment of the conception or as human
cells subject to the wishes of those who create them.  Yet, these differences need not
necessarily affect existing ART practices.  Indeed, Louisiana enacted a statute that
treats embryos from the point of conception until implantation in a woman’s body
as “juridical persons” entitled to equal respect.   Georgia has enacted provisions to17
facilitate embryo transfer that use the language of adoption and adoption-like
procedures as part of the process.   The fertility industry, which successfully18
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See Press Release, RESOLVE, The National Infertility Association and Supporters19
Defeat Dangerous Georgia Bill (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www.resolve.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=fmed_mccpr040809.
See Ertelt, supra note 18.20
See Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle of IVF, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &  POL’Y 275, 289–9021
(2006).
See NAOM I CAHN &  JUNE CARBONE, RED FAM ILIES V. BLUE FAM ILIES, (Oxford22
University Press, forthcoming 2010); see also Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How
Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEM OGRAPHY  607,
607–09 (2004) (finding that college educated women have experienced the greatest delay in
age of child-rearing).
Davis, supra note 21, at 289–90.23
See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &  HUMAN SERVICES,24
NCHS DATA BRIEF NO . 21, MORE WOMEN ARE HAVING THEIR FIRST CHILD LATER IN LIFE
(2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db21.pdf (detailing rise in
average age for first birth to 25).
See LESLIE HARRIS, JUNE R. CARBONE &  LEE E. TEITELBAUM , FAM ILY LAW  1004 (4th25
ed. 2009).
blocked proposed legislation to limit the number of embryos that could be implanted
at one time,  did not oppose these proposals because clinics in these states do not19
destroy existing embryos in any event, and the new legislation would not otherwise
restrict IVF practices.   Like mandatory sonograms, parental consent, waiting20
periods, and restrictions on late term abortions, these measures underscore fealty to
a particular moral viewpoint without triggering a backlash from politically powerful
opponents.
The creation of a legal infrastructure to encourage embryo transfers is another
matter.  The demand for fertility services is growing.  To date, IVF users have
overwhelmingly been relatively wealthy and better educated.   College educated21
women have experienced the greatest delay in family formation, hence the greatest
age-related fertility issues.   Moreover, the lack of public funding for fertility22
services has limited the benefits to those of independent means.   And, of course,23
those opposed to IVF per se have had little reason to participate in the creation of
the industry.  The result is an industry with a small, but affluent and politically
powerful clientele that has flourished with relatively little oversight.
All of these factors may be changing.  The average age of first birth is increas-
ing for the country as a whole.   Adoptions have become harder to come by, and24
international adoptions, which have filled some of the gap, have declined as the
supplier nations have imposed more restrictions.   The adoption of legal measures25
facilitating embryo transfer for reproductive purposes may accordingly take root, not
only to object to the ethical practices of others, but to create new networks for
assisted reproduction—and ultimately for the recreation of family life.
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See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look26
at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH . L. REV. 1035  (2002).
See infra notes 121–132 and accompanying text.27
See infra note 127 and accompanying text.28
See infra note 209 and accompanying text.29
See id.30
See, e.g., Tracey Garcia, Snowflake Program Matches Families, Embryos, PASADENA31
STAR-NEW S, Feb. 28, 2009, http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/news/ci_11807959.
See infra Part IV. A–C.32
See CAHN &  CARBONE, supra note 22.33
The result raises a series of far reaching questions about the relationship be-
tween legal infrastructure and moral understandings.   To date, ART generally and26
IVF in particular have developed with a minimum of public scrutiny and with
practices that proceed from the interaction of physicians committed to IVF and
patients who seek out their services.27
Two pieces of legislation have nonetheless had far reaching effects.  The first,
a federal statute that requires reporting clinic success rates has meant the U.S.
industry, to a much greater degree than elsewhere, values successful pregnancies,
creating more emphasis on techniques such as longer in vitro development that
select for healthier embryos and creating greater resistance to restrictions, such as
those on the number of embryos implanted, that might result in more futile
attempts.   The second, state legislation in California that created a comprehensive28
legal infrastructure for embryo transfer has also helped to create an ethic of dona-
tion.   The legislation facilitates embryo transfer for research purposes, creating a29
registry, specifying consent forms, and clarifying the status and responsibilities of
donors, donees, and fertility clinics.   This legislation, which was designed to help30
spur stem cell research, also facilities embryo donation for reproductive purposes,
and embryo adoption clinics appear to be flourishing in the state.31
Additional legislation in Louisiana, Georgia and Oklahoma may similarly
encourage creation of alternative networks for embryo transfers.   The result could32
be new reproductive practices that reconcile IVF procedures with a greater variety
of religious beliefs, facilitating family formation at later ages for a larger part of the
population.   The development of such a legal infrastructure—and the creation of33
a new constituency for IVF—might then create greater support for assisted repro-
duction and break the log jam that has prevented regulation designed to promote
safety and effectiveness.
Alternatively, of course, the result could also be to create a fundamentalist
infrastructure for the oversight of assisted reproduction to the exclusion of other
views, including the views of the majority of the population.  The Catholic Church,
for example, which has led in the development of a comprehensive theological
approach to the treatment of embryos as human beings, rejects the acceptability of
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See infra note 115 and accompanying text.34
IVF generally, and the use of IVF to create extra embryos in particular.   Yet,34
legislating these views, which would either restrict the availability of IVF or pre-
clude some of the practices that increase success rates, would be far more controver-
sial than either the symbolic act of declaring embryos to be “juridical persons” or
the practical one of encouraging embryo adoption networks.
In this article, we consider where such nascent regulatory efforts are likely to
take us, examining in particular:
1. The differences in approaches to ART regulation involving fundamen-
talist principles, which treat embryos as humans from the moment of
conception, versus more secular approaches that defer to the values of
the progenitors;
2. The inherent tensions in a fundamentalist approach that encourages
embryo transfer for reproductive purposes before working through the
acceptability of IVF practices;
3. The potential for the creation of fundamentalist friendly ART regula-
tion;
4. Its likely impact on the future development of the industry, given the
ease of fertility tourism, cross-border clinic selection, and the recreation
of political battle lines; and,
5. The potential redefinition of constitutionally protected reproductive
rights and family integrity.
In undertaking this analysis, we start with the factors driving “embryo fundamen-
talism.” We will explain the rise of a more polarized political discourse around
moral issues, and the role of that polarization in giving voice to the most fundamen-
talist positions on reproduction.  We will then describe the different positions
underlying the moral status of embryos and how these positions fit within the larger
national political discourse.  We will provide a detailed comparison of existing
legislation that governs disposition of the embryos created in IVF, comparing the
approaches of California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Georgia.  We will end with
consideration of how the new legislation may shape the future development of an
industry still largely in its infancy.
I. CONTESTED DISCOURSES AND EMBRYO ETHICS
The fight over the future of assisted reproduction may depend on the status of
embryos.  Janet Dolgin writes that the idea of embryos began as a normatively
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Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos: Biology, Ideology, and Politics, 16 HEALTH35
MATRIX 27 (2006).
Id. at 27.36
Lars Noah writes that “[o]ne could criticize some of the existing academic commentary37
as engaging in little more than bioethical parlor games. . . . Unfortunately, some of the more
fundamental questions about the safety of different techniques and how best to control those
risks have received less scrutiny. In fact, the controversy over human cloning has perhaps
prematurely left unanswered lingering but hardly inconsequential questions about the now
relatively lower-tech ARTs.” Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls
of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603 (2003). For even more scathing
criticism of the failure to interrogate the use of fertility enhancing drugs, see Michele
Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 1657, 1724–25 (2008). Goodwin
observes that “[r]esearchers prodigiously document how ovaries may be stressed by
undergoing cycles to release numerous eggs, many times more than that produced in a
normal, one-month ovulation cycle. According to one commentator, some researchers are
concerned about the stress ovaries endure through aggressive hyper-stimulation procedures
to produce more eggs, warning that ‘stimulating them, with drugs like Clomid or Pergonal,
to produce more eggs could cause more stress, perhaps damaging ovaries.’” Id. at 1724–25.
She also cites research suggesting a link between fertility drugs and cancer in both patients
and fetuses. Id. at 1725.
See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).38
Id.39
See id.; Davis, supra note 21, at 287 & n.86 (suggesting that Louisiana might rule40
otherwise); see also In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003) (“[N]o
transfer, release, disposition, or use of the embryos can occur without the signed
authorization of both donors. If a stalemate results, the status quo would be maintained. The
practical effect will be that the embryos are stored indefinitely unless both parties can agree
to destroy the fertilized eggs.”); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d, at 1059 (Mass. 2000) (“In this case, we
are asked to decide whether the law of the Commonwealth may compel an individual to
become a parent over his or her contemporaneous objection. The husband signed this consent
form in 1991. Enforcing the form against him would require him to become a parent over his
present objection to such an undertaking. We decline to do so.”). For an examination of these
disputes, see Upchurch, supra note 12, at 2110–11.
“neutral term” in contrast to use of the words “fetus” or “baby.”   It became politi-35
cally contested terrain with its association with the “culture wars.”36
Nonetheless, assisted reproduction itself, despite the use of fertility enhancing
drugs and other techniques that pose potential health risks to mother and children,
have received relatively little scrutiny.37
The legal status of embryos, has been addressed in one context: disputes over
the disposition of frozen embryos when couples divorce.   In these cases, the male38
progenitor has opposed use of the embryos for reproductive purposes, while the
female progenitor, who is more likely to see the fertilized eggs as her only opportu-
nity to produce biologically related offspring, has wanted to implant them.   Every39
court to rule on the issue has prohibited implantation even when the couple had
signed an agreement that would have allowed it.   The courts have recognized40
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See Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes Over Frozen Preembryos & the “Right Not to be a41
Parent,” 12 COLUM . J. GENDER &  L. 128, 131  (2003).
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). Indeed, the Davis court observed42
that “preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.
It follows that any interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the preembryos in
this case is not a true property interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of
ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of
the preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law.” Id. at 597.
Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 41–42 (Tex. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct.43
1662 (2008).
But see Teresa Stanton Collett, Whose Life Is It Anyway?: Texas Public Policy and44
Contracts to Kill Embryonic Children, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 371 (2009) (criticizing Roman
opinion).
The contrast is striking, of course, because in the case of IVF the embryos could only45
have been created through activities designed to produce a child. No one engages in IVF,
after all, because they were swept away by the passion of the moment.
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION &  THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).46
Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST.47
U. L. REV. 101 (2003).
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,48
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
See Dolgin, supra note 47, at 130.49
embryos in this context as something other than rights-bearing human beings, and
concluded that the male interest in preventing “involuntary” parenthood outweighed
the partner’s desire for offspring.   Though some have argued that embryos are41
human lives and should be implanted if one of the progenitors wishes to do so,
courts in states as conservative as Tennessee  and Texas  have held otherwise, and42 43
the decisions have encountered relatively little opposition from anti-abortion
groups.44
A series of authors have attempted to address why abortion—and the female
interest in similarly avoiding involuntary parenthood —has become so much more45
intense an issue in contrast, and why that intensity seems to be increasing.  The
conventional wisdom, created through the pioneering work of Kristin Luker  and46
extended in the legal context by Janet Dolgin  and Reva Siegel and Robert Post,47 48
is that abortion rose to political prominence only when it became associated with
tension over changing family norms.  These authors argue that while the debate
about abortion is framed as a debate about the status of embryonic and fetal life, it
is also “a last stand for the preservation of traditional family life and the values and
beliefs that sustained that form of family.”   Writing during the period in the 1980s49
when President Reagan was putting together a conservative coalition and trying to
recruit Protestant evangelicals, Luker emphasized the importance of conventional
gender roles to anti-abortion women’s sense of place and the threat pro-life forces
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LUKER, supra note 46, at 197–202.50
Dolgin, supra note 47, at 132–33.51
See Dolgin, supra note 47, for a comparison of the two issues.52
See id. at 105.53
Lymari Morales, Majority of Americans Likely Support Stem Cell Decision, GALLOP,54
Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116485/majority-americans-likely-support-stem
-cell-decision.aspx.
Id.55
Julia Duin, Vatican Condemns Cloning, In Vitro; Document Outlines Biomedical56
Ethics, WASH . T IM ES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1.
Davis, supra note 21, at 278 & nn.19–20 (citing the Cleveland Clinic as an example57
felt from the challenge to traditional sexual mores and the changing nature of the
family.50
Over time, however, the fight against abortion has assumed a life of its own, one
focused much more single-mindedly on the status of the fetus and the perceived
moral outrage associated with abortion.  Dolgin writes, “pro-life adherents are more
reluctant than ever to compromise their position with regard to fetal and embryonic
status.  Their rhetoric, their tactics, and their underlying agenda all have come to
depend increasingly on the notion that abortion constitutes murder because fetuses
and embryos are people.”51
As the movement has become more intense and more focused on fetal status,
embryo fundamentalism, as we have termed it, is less likely to be limited to abor-
tion.  Indeed, over the last decade, the same insistence on absolutism has shaped the
debate over embryonic stem cell research.   This research involves extracting52
pluripotent stem cells, which have the potential to develop into any part of the body,
from an embryo during an early stage of development, thereby destroying the
embryo.   While the opposition to stem cell research has been every bit as adamant53
as the opposition to abortion in some quarters, it has never commanded as much
support among the public as a whole because it lacks a connection to traditional
family values.  Public opinion polls show that 62% of the American public finds
embryonic stem cell research to be morally acceptable, compared to only 30%
opposed.   On the issue of government funding, however, 57% of Republicans54
favor restrictions while Democrats and Independents are opposed.   The issue55
accordingly appeals to embryo fundamentalists even if it does not command the
same degree of support as anti-abortion politics generally.
In vitro fertilization, however, may present the issue of fetal status—and thus
trigger embryo fundamentalism—in starker terms.  Under current practices, IVF will
almost inevitably produce excess embryos.  The average IVF cycle produces as
many as seven extra embryos that are not used.   Moreover, while a few clinics will56
work with couples who want to implant all of the embryos produced, many will not
for fear that the practice will lower their success rates or that implantation will result
in multiple births, endangering the health of the resulting children and mother.57
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of a clinic that will implant all embryos produced).
Bob Smietana, Leftover Embryos Lie in Frozen Limbo, THE TENNESSEAN , Apr. 5,58
2009.
Id.59
Davis, supra note 21, at 280 (citing Sheryl de Lacey, Parent Identity and “Virtual”60
Children: Why Patients Discard Rather than Donate Unused Embryos, 20 HUM . REPROD .
1661, 1665 (2005)).
Laura Bell, What is the Fate of Leftover Frozen Embryos, PARENTING (Aug. 27, 2009),61
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32489239/ns/today-parenting_and_family/. “In a recent
survey of 58 couples, researches from the University of California in San Francisco found
that 72 percent were undecided about the fate of their stored embryos . . . . [c]ouples have
held on to embryos for five years or more.” Id.
See Lyerly, supra note 10, at 499.62
Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Factors That Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions About63
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 FERTILITY &  STERILITY 1623 (2006).
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 21, at 292 (“[W]hile the embryo in the abortion context is,64
These practices necessarily produce extra embryos; the number of leftover
embryos in the United States is estimated to be approximately 500,000.   When58
people are asked what they would like to do with their leftover embryos, they may
save the embryos for their own further use, donate them to another couple, donate
them for medical research, destroy them, or keep them “in frozen limbo.”   Davis59
suggests that “the more these stored embryos come to seem like children to their
‘parents,’ the less willing the ‘parents’ are to donate them to infertile couples and
to imagine their children growing up in unknown circumstances.”   As they con-60
template these options, couples may be frozen with paralysis, unable to decide what
to do, “waiting on an epiphany that never comes.”61
Or consider another study of 1000 couples, which found:
54% of respondents with cryopreserved embryos were very
likely to use them for reproduction, 21% were very likely to
donate for research, 7% or fewer were very likely to choose any
other option.  Respondents who ascribed high importance to
concerns about the health or well-being of the embryo, fetus, or
future child were more likely to thaw and discard embryos or
freeze them indefinitely.62
These attitudes suggest that couples undergoing IVF will inevitably produce a large
number of embryos that will never be implanted,  and that their decisions reflect not63
callous indifference, but profound concern about the fate of the embryos.
IVF practices are accordingly on a collision course with embryo fundamental-
ism.  The Catholic Church and other religious groups have misgivings about IVF
generally.  While the anti-abortion movement as a whole has not mobilized against
IVF,  its focus has instead been on the embryos.  For those who believe that the64
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as Dolgin shows, a stand-in or replacement for concerns about family life and structure, the
embryo in the context of IVF exists primarily to allow married, heterosexual, economically
stable couples to ‘complete’ their families by having children.”). On the other hand, we
suspect that the majority of the public has simply not focused on the issue and IVF itself has
not crystallized as a constituent of political identity. Many religions other than the Catholic
Church do not have a strong position on it and pro-life forces (including pro-life Catholics)
view IVF as secondary to other concerns. See, e.g., discussion of Nadya Suleman, a.k.a. the
“Octomom,” with anti-abortion blogger Jill Stanek asserting, “Finally, about Octomom. Pro-
lifers differ on the morality of IVF. But most agree children should not purposefully be born
into a single parent home.” Dan Gilgoff, Are Opponents of Embryonic Stem Cell Research
Using Octo-Mom as a Poster Girl?, US NEWS &  WORLD REPORT, Jan. 16, 2010, available
at http://www.usnews.com/blogs/god-and-country/2009/03/13/are-opponents-of-embryonic
-stem-cell-research-using-octo-mom-as-a-poster-girl.html.
Stephen J. Grabill, Evangelicals and Embryo Adoption, THE SAN D IEGO UNION-65
TRIBUNE, Sept. 8, 2006, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060908/news
_lz1e8grabill.html.
Nightlight Christian Adoption Homepage, http://www.nightlight.org/adoption-services/66
snowflakes-embryo/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
See, e.g., Jennifer Baker, Comment, A War of Words: How Fundamentalist Rhetoric67
Threatens Reproductive Autonomy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 671 (2009). For thoughtful
explorations of some of these issues involving moral values and money, see Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchanges: Sunny Samaritans
and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market, 72 LAW . &  CONTEM P. PROB. 59
(2009).
cluster of cells are not just the potential for life, but akin to a living child, the
indefinite freezing, much less destruction, of embryos is anathema.  Consider this
quote from the Journal of Markets and Morality:
Christians and defenders of human dignity who acknowledge
embryos to be preborn persons have a dual responsibility to
protect the innocent and also to do no harm.  The stakes are high
because, as Ron Stoddart founder of Nightlight Christian Adop-
tions stresses, “[a]n embryo is not a potential human life—it is
human life with potential.”65
Christians who share these views are calling for the “rescue” of these human lives
with potential from their deep freezes.  Thus, Nightlight Christian Adoptions
declares on its website that “[i]n 1997, Nightlight began the Snowflakes Frozen
Embryo Adoption Program, which is helping some of the more than 400,000 frozen
embryos realize their ultimate purpose—life—while sharing the hope of a child with
an infertile couple.”   The appropriation of the language of life—of putting the face66
of a child on the cells in the deep freeze—moves ART practices from the privacy of
market-based services into the political arena.67
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Janet L. Dolgin et al., Attitudes About Human Embryos, Embryonic Stem Cell68
Research, and Related Matters, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319, 322–23 (2008).
See id.; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 291.69
Indeed, Dolgin observes that for the Catholic Church during the nineteenth century,70
“opposing abortion was part of a more general opposition to modernization. At stake was the
future of a venerable universe of power and belief. That universe was grounded in faith; it
prized hierarchy and status and it frowned upon autonomous choice for almost everyone.”
Dolgin, supra note 47, at 117.
See Lydia Saad, More Americans “Pro-Life” Than “Pro-Choice” for First Time,71
GALLUP, May 15, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118399/more-americans-pro-life-than
-pro-choice-first-time.aspx (while 51% of Americans identify themselves as pro-life, 53%
of Americans think abortions should be legal but only under certain circumstances).
See Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint: Political72
Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 AM. J. SOC. 408, 410  (2008).
II. ABORTION TSUNAMIS AND POLITICAL SALIENCE
The staying power of the pro-life movement rests with a shift away from its
identification with the moral attributes of the traditional family per se and toward
an insistence on the personhood of the fetus.   Some scholars associate the power68
of that shift with the ability to personalize the embryo, to use ultrasound to show
fetal development in utero, and to capture the imagination of the public.   Other69
scholars, however, explain the appeal of abortion politics in terms of its moral
clarity—and the ideological reorganization of American politics.   This analysis70
suggests that it is the very absolutism and intrinsic divisiveness of the abortion issue
that creates its political power and that the importance of embryo fundamentalism
depends on whether it can harness the same motivations.
Few debate the intrinsic divisiveness of abortion—at least as it has been cast in
recent political debate.  Either the union of egg and sperm marks the beginning of
life and destruction of the resulting embryo is murder or the moment of conception
constitutes one step among many on the way to reproduction and the embryo’s
status depends on its importance in the eyes of its progenitors.  Indeed, the very act
of stating the issue in such terms—between an absolute standard and a contextual
one—triggers deep divisions that go beyond the issue of abortion itself.
Despite this, religious views on the origin of life vary considerably, and a
majority of the American people favors intermediate positions on abortion.71
Moreover, while the issue has always been controversial, it has not always been
political.  Instead, the overlap of polarized public opinion with legislative partisan-
ship on abortion is relatively new, and reflects the ideological realignment of the
major parties.72
In describing the forces driving polarization in political life, political science
research considers the extent to which values preferences align with partisan
identity, political rhetoric, religious participation, and other forms of group member-
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For a summary of the political science literature, see id. (finding polarization on moral73
issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on moral issues among
the better educated and the more politically active and polarization on moral issues
increasing much more dramatically since the mid-eighties). See also MORRIS P. FIORINA,
SAM UEL J. ABRAM S &  JEREM Y  C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A  POLARIZED
AM ERICA 37–49 (2005) (disputing the polarization thesis and maintaining that public
attitudes have been remarkably stable); John H. Evans, Have Americans’ Attitudes Become
More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71, 87–89 (2003) (concluding that activists
have become more partisan and polarized on values issues).
This section is adapted from the analysis in CAHN &  CARBONE, supra note 22, ch. 4.74
See also Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110
W. VA. L. REV. 459, 465 (2007).
See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN . L. REV. 115, 122–2475
(2007).
John T. Jost, The End of the End of Ideology, 61 AM . PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 651 (2006).76
GEORGE LAKO FF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW  LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 377
(2002). For views that cultural styles and values, with or without a genetic component, also
affect political perceptions and make divisions relatively impervious to fact based arguments,
see Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Culture, and
Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 283 (2005); Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &  POL’Y  REV. 149, 163 (2006);
see generally The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://www
.culturalcognition.net/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
“Most liberals begin with the premise that teenagers should not have babies . . . while78
most conservatives begin with the premise [that single teenagers] should not have sex.”
News Release, Stanford University News Service, Teen Pregnancy: Economics More
ship.   We have argued at length elsewhere that the more that these factors corre-73
spond and reinforce each other, the deeper the divisions; the more these different
sources of convictions and identity crosscut each other, the easier to craft political
compromises.   The result produces a tsunami effect: waves that reinforce each74
other reach greater heights with lower troughs between them.
A growing literature considers the extent to which political positions correspond
to values preferences.  These studies differ in their hypotheses as to the source of the
differences, and they do not necessarily use the same vocabulary in describing them.
Nonetheless, the major studies appear to produce similar results in finding some link
between those who are attracted to absolute values, and those who see the world in
terms of contextual decision-making.   These studies complement older political75
analyses that tied political orientation to traits such as openness and conscientious-
ness.   Linguist George Lakoff argues that the differences in worldviews correspond76
to different rhetorical styles and openness to different types of arguments.77
This analysis suggests that not only do anti-abortion stances appeal more to
those inclined toward absolutist world views, but that those so inclined are also less
likely to favor access to abortion by teens or the unmarried for reasons that may not
be intrinsic to the issue of abortion itself.78
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Important Than Age (Oct. 20, 1993), available at http://news.stanford.edu/pr/93/
931020Arc3093.html (quoting Stanford University Law Professor Deborah Rhode).
For a discussion of the political transformation of this issue, see Post & Siegel, supra79
note 48, at 412–23.
For a discussion of the Catholic position on abortion, see T IM O TH Y  A. BYRNES,80
CATHOLIC B ISHOPS IN AM ERICAN POLITICS 54–57 (1991) (suggesting that Roe helped
mobilize Catholic bishops because it moved abortion politics from state legislatures onto a
national political agenda).
See Post & Siegel, supra note 48, at 415–17.81
See id. at 415.82
Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, for example, hypothesize that the percentage of83
people listing “no religion” in public opinion polls doubled in the nineties in reaction to the
growing identification of religion with conservative politics. Michael Hout & Claude S.
Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations, 67
AM . SOC. REV. 165, 166, 188–89 (2002). Nonetheless, religious attendance rather than
denominational identity tends to provide the most robust predictor of attitudes toward
abortion. Indeed, frequent church attendees are likely to oppose abortion even if they attend
relatively liberal churches who do not oppose abortion on religious grounds. See Ted G.
Jelen & Clyde Wilcox, Causes and Consequences of Public Attitudes Toward Abortion: A
Review and Research Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 489, 492–93  (2003).
A preference for more absolutist versus more contextualist political perspec-
tives, or for traditional values versus more modernist values, does not automatically
translate, however, into particular political positions.  Instead, public views on
particular issues are mediated by religious, political and other loyalties, which may
undercut or reinforce each other.
Before the 1980s, abortion in the U.S. was viewed as a largely Catholic issue.79
The Catholic Church then as now staked out a strict position on conception as the
beginning of life and made abortion a frequent topic of Sunday sermons.   Post and80
Siegel report that the political dynamics of the issue shifted in the eighties when
Protestant churches reframed the abortion question in terms of changing gender
roles and family values.   Once the issue became less associated with Catholic81
teaching, and more with the concerns Lakoff and Dolgin identify about the ability
to defy conventional teachings on marriage and sexuality, opposition to abortion
attracted greater support across sectarian lines.82
This analysis suggests that part of what has taken place in politics is a “resort-
ing” in which those drawn toward more absolutist values, who in most eras are
likely to be conservative and to attend church regularly, have also become more
likely in the modern era to vote Republican.  Conversely, those who tend to be more
contextualist in their decision-making, more egalitarian than hierarchical in their
value preferences, more open to different choices, and less judgmental about others
are more likely in the modern era not to attend church and to vote Democratic, rather
than simply to be more liberal members of a given party or congregation.   As these83
forces reinforce each other, Republicans have become more adamant in their anti-
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See also BILL B ISHOP, THE B IG SORT 27 (2008) (In 2006, 69% of Democrats were84
strongly pro-choice compared to 21% of Republicans).
Bishop notes for example that historically political loyalty did not correspond with85
church attendance. Id. at 82.
Id. at 72–77.86
Baldassarri & Gelman, supra note 72, at 409.87
Survey Report, The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Support for88
Abortion Slips: Issue Ranks Lower on the Agenda (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://people
-press.org/report/549/support-for-abortion-slips.
Drew Westen, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EM OTION IN DECIDING THE FATE89
OF THE NATION 178  (2007).
abortion policies, and anti-abortion positions have become more closely associated
with more traditionalist religious denominations.   Three important constituents of84
identity—a preference for absolutes, religious identity, and political loyalty—thus
overlap, and coincide with a greater ability to choose congregations, neighborhoods,
cable TV channels, and internet sites that reinforce the views and the values associ-
ated with them.   Bill Bishop argues that the more people associate with those who85
think the same way they do, the more intense and extreme the convictions become.86
Political scientists Baldassarri and Gelman conclude that: “Political polarization
constitutes a threat to the extent that it induces alignment along multiple lines of
potential conflict and organizes individuals and groups around exclusive identities,
thus crystallizing interests into opposite factions.”87
These developments, which reflect a much broader political realignment than
simply a shift on abortion, frame the context for the emergence of the pro-life
movement, with its efforts to make the fetus into a child, as a political force in the
modern era.  The developments make compromise (and perhaps even reasoned
discourse) less likely.  Some of the developments reflect a self-conscious political
strategy, a strategy made possible in part by the fact that emotions about abortion
are not exactly parallel.  As polls indicate, those opposed to abortion are less
inclined to compromise than those who favor its legality (and, of course, those
attracted to absolutist positions are less inclined to compromise than those who see
political issues on a continuum).   Expressing opposition to abortion is thus neces-88
sary to hold those who see abortion as an all or nothing political issue.  At the same
time, imposing some restrictions on abortion need not necessarily offend the
majority who favor making abortion legal, a group that is less likely to view the
issue in absolute terms.  Psychologist Drew Westen describes the Republican
political response in these terms, observing that it has been “unequivocal: describe
abortion as murder, define an uncompromising stance as the only moral stance one
could take, get the 30 percent of Americans with the least tolerance for ambiguity
on moral questions to the polls, and let the Democrats offer dozens of different
positions . . . .”89
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Jelen & Wilcox, supra note 83, at 495 (citing David Schecter, What Drives the Voting90
on Abortion Policy? Investigating Partisanship and Religion in the State Legislative Arena,
23 WOMEN &  POL. 61, 74–77 (2001)).
Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party91
Polarization In American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN . REV.
POL. SCI. 83, 104 (2006).
Bill Bishop, for example, reports that from the end of World War II through the92
seventies, between 35% and 45% of Congress would have been considered moderates, while
today only 10% would be so labeled. BISHOP, supra note 84, at 246–47.
See id. at 97; Jelen & Wilcox, supra note 83, at 495. In Canada, for example, pro-life93
legislators voted against a measure to recriminalize abortion when the legislation in their
view did not go far enough in outlawing abortion. See ABORTION POLITICS, WOM EN’S
MOVEMENTS, AND THE DEM OCRATIC STATE: A  COM PARATIVE STUDY OF STATE FEMINISM
81 (Dorothy McBride Stetson ed., 2001).
O. Carter Snead, for example, in his retrospective on Bush era bioethics, comments94
that the “most distinctive feature of President Bush’s conception of human equality was its
unconditional and uncontingent nature.” O. Carter Snead, Public Bioethics and the Bush
Presidency, 32 HARV. J. L. &  PUB. POL’Y 867, 872 (2009).
In doing so, he clearly equated protection of frozen embryos with the anti-abortion95
cause, observing that “there is no such thing as a spare embryo. Every embryo is unique and
genetically complete, like every other human being. And each of us started out our life this
way. These lives are not raw material to be exploited, but gifts.” Priests for Life, President
Finally, intriguing research finds that while elite and mass polarization reinforce
each other, the more powerful influence may be that of party leaders on the public.
A study of Florida legislators, for example, reported that the individual characteris-
tics of legislators, not the characteristics of voters in the district, best predicted votes
on abortion-related issues.   Other work indicates that the increase in polarization90
among party activists is the most likely driving force producing greater polarization
among both party leaders and the public.   Almost all observers agree that the result91
has been destruction of the center in Congress, and in many state legislatures.92
Accordingly, while centrist leaders might diffuse contentious issues such as those
surrounding abortion, most legislators in today’s more partisan political environ-
ment emphasize positions opposed to compromise.93
III. LAW, THE SEARCH FOR BABIES AND THE CREATION OF AN INDUSTRY
Fertility politics, of course, are not necessarily abortion politics, but the regula-
tion of in vitro fertilization, at least when it intersects with embryo fundamentalism,
could recreate some of the same alliances.  The pro-life movement, having staked
out an uncompromising stance on the status of embryos,  has been eager to exploit94
the images of the hundreds of thousands of frozen cells in fertility clinic freezers.
In 2001, for example, President George W. Bush embraced “embryo adoption,”
speaking about the importance of ensuring that “our society’s most vulnerable
members are protected and defended at every stage of life,”  and securing federal95
2010] EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM 17
Discusses Embryo Adoption and Ethical Stem Cell Research (May 24, 2005), http://www
.priestsforlife.org/news/05-05-24bushstemcellresearch.htm; see Jaime E. Conde, Embryo
Donation: The Government Adopts a Cause, 13 WM . &  MARY J. WOMEN &  L. 273 (2006).
See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, The Problem with ‘Embryo Adoption’: Why Is the96
Government Giving Money to ‘Snowflakes?,’ MSNBC, June 24, 2003, http://www.msnbc
.msn.com/id/3076556/ (criticizing award of $1 million in federal funds to agency promoting
embryo donation for reproductive purposes).
See discussion of Dolgin and Davis, supra pp. 8–11.97
See CAHN &  CARBONE, supra note 22.98
Seung-Eun Song & Youngtae Cho, Educational Differences in Impaired Fecundity and99
the Utilization of Infertility Services 3 (2004), available at http://www.allacademic.com/
meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/1/0/2/5/pages110252/p110252-2.php.
While infertility is more likely to affect the less educated, more highly educated100
individuals are more likely to receive medical services. See id. at 2–3.
Id. at 6.101
V ICTORIA CLAY WRIGHT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC D ISEASE PREV. &  HEALTH102
PROMOTION , ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES,
2002, 6 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5402a1.htm.
J. Farley Ordovensky Staniec & Natalie J. Webb, Utilization of Infertility Services:103
How Much Does Money Matter?, 42 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 971 (2007), available at http://
www.ncbl.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1955265/pdf/hesr004-0971.pdf.
Katherine E. Heck et al., Delayed Childbearing by Education Level in the United104
States, 1969–1994, 1 MATERNAL AND CHILD . HEALTH  J. 81, 86  (1997) available at http://
www.springerlink.com/content/g40p440425n3077/fulltext.pdf.
Id.105
funds to promote a movement, the transfer of embryos for reproductive purposes,
that it is not clear anyone wanted for other than ideological reasons.96
At the same time, while some scholars underscore IVF’s association with
heterosexual efforts to complete traditional families,  others emphasize the class97
and cultural divide separating IVF users from the rest of the public.   Poorer women98
suffer higher overall rates of impaired fertility.   Untreated sexually transmitted99
diseases have a significant effect on the ability to reproduce, and women without
access to routine medical care suffer from them disproportionately.   Despite this,100
better educated, older and wealthier women are more likely to seek out and use
fertility services.   In 2002, for example, 54% of women undergoing fertility101
treatments were over the age of thirty-five.   Another study found that income,102
insurance coverage, and parity (number of previous births) all significantly affect
the probability of seeking infertility treatment, though in different ways and to
different degrees.103
Complicating the matter is the fact that the increased demand for fertility
services is associated with later ages of childbearing—a factor identified with the
investment college-educated women make in their careers.   The most highly104
educated women are the most likely to postpone childbearing.   Kristin Luker105
found in the 1980s that a significant difference between pro-life and pro-choice
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LUKER, supra note 46, at 197.106
CAHN &  CARBONE, supra note 22, at ch. 1.107
Id.; see also Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral108
Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON . 730, 731
(2002) (examining the correlations between the availability of contraception, abortion and
the age of marriage); Ron Lesthaeghe & Lisa Neidert, Voting and Families: America’s
Second Demographic Transition, NEW  GEOGRAPHY , Dec. 11, 2008, available at http://www
.newgeography.com/content/00461-voting-and-families-america%E2%80%99s-second
-demographic-transition (establishing a correlation between family form and voting patterns);
Ron Lesthaeghe & Lisa Neidert, The “Second Demographic Transition” in the U.S.:
Exception or Textbook Example?, Mar. 2006, available at http://sdt.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/
online/US_SDT_text.pdf.
Davis points out, for example, that “[b]etween 1978 and 1994, public acceptance of109
IVF in the United States increased from 60 to 75%,” and suggests that this is true because
IVF, unlike abortion, involves the efforts of traditional heterosexual couples to have children.
See Davis, supra note 21, at 282.
Fertility Lifelines, State Mandated Insurance Coverage, http://www.fertilitylifelines110
.com/payingfortreatment/state-mandatedinsurancelist.jsp (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
California, New York, and Louisiana, however, exclude all or part of the costs associated
with IVF.
activists was the age of family formation; the “average” pro-life activist woman in
1984 was married at seventeen, had three or more children, had some college
education, and was not employed for pay.  In contrast, the “average” pro-choice
activist woman had some graduate education, married at twenty-two, had one or two
children, and was employed outside the home.   Today, similar differences de-106
scribe the population of states likely to vote “red” rather than “blue.”  Family
characteristics have become a major predictor of voting patterns, and the politically
relevant characteristics include age of marriage, teen births, overall fertility levels
(i.e., the number of children per family), and women’s employment patterns.107
While we have not found more recent studies that examine the relationship between
age of marriage and pro-choice or pro-life views, the states that show the greatest
support for abortion rights also tend to have higher average ages of marriage and
lower fertility rates.108
Accordingly, the demand for IVF, like the significance of abortion, varies with
the importance of modern versus traditional patterns of family formation, and an
embrace of modern family patterns has occurred more readily in the more liberal and
pro-choice parts of the country.  Nonetheless, support for IVF is widespread—three-
quarters of the American public approves of IVF —and the fifteen states that have109
mandated some form of insurance for fertility services seem to be a random assort-
ment that include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas and West Virginia.110
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See Medicine: Test-Tube Baby: It’s a Girl, TIME, Aug. 7, 1978, available at http://111
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948239,00.html.
See Roger Rosenblatt, Baby M.—Emotions for Sale, TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, available at112
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963927,00.html.
Nadya Suleman: Octuplets’ Mom “Didn’t Want to Get Married,” Had IVF for 14 Kids,113
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 31, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/31/
nadya-suleman-octuplets-m_n_162756.html.
Business school professor Debora Spar describes our existing regulatory regime as114
follows: “In the United States, however, regulatory and legislative authorities have largely
ignored the market for reproductive services. There are very few restrictions on fertility
treatments and little regulation of providers. Instead, the market for fertility in the United
States is vibrant, competitive, and expanding in the absence of any kind of formal controls.
Because the United States is such a large and technically advanced market, moreover, it
serves as a magnet for infertile couples around the world.” DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY
BUSINESS: HOW  MONEY , SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COM M ERCE OF CONCEPTION  5
(2006).
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in115
Embryos are another matter because the passions they inspire, the absolutist
rhetoric associated with them, and their association with political identity have the
potential to drive the future regulation of assisted reproduction.  Moreover, public
discourse and legislative initiatives often proceed from a combination of philosophi-
cal predispositions and prejudices and sensational news coverage.  Examples include
Louise Brown (the first “test tube baby”),  Melissa Stern (known as “Baby M,” the111
child conceived through the use of artificial insemination and the subject of the first
contested surrogacy case),  and Nadya Suleman (known as “Octomom,” the single112
mother of six who used IVF to give birth to octuplets).   Given the incendiary113
nature of anything associated with the moral status of embryos, the definition of the
pro-life movement in absolutist terms, and the existence of a cadre of legislators
who have staked their political careers on identification with abortion politics, it
would be remarkable if the regulation of ART were not influenced by these divi-
sions.
Indeed, culture war politics have already limited oversight of assisted reproduc-
tion.  The controversial nature of the practices has obstructed agreement on financ-
ing and oversight, and the ironic result is that the industry has grown with few of the
controls that shape other parts of medical practice.   The systematic provision of114
services—research, testing, regulation, insurance coverage, and financing—has been
caught up in the same political divisions that hamstring more systematic approaches
to contraception and abortion.  Legislative and regulatory oversight of assisted
reproduction has been characterized by moral posturing and regulatory gridlock.
Comprehensive approaches have stalled in part because of religious opposition.
The Catholic Church has opposed in vitro fertilization altogether, objecting that the
practices emphasizing “the human dignity proper to the embryo,” and “the right of
every person to be conceived and to be born within marriage and from marriage.”115
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its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day,
available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con
_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html. The instruction states, “[i]n
homologous IVF and ET . . . therefore, even if it is considered in the context of ‘de facto’
existing sexual relations, the generation of the human person is objectively deprived of its
proper perfection: namely, that if being the result and fruit of a conjugal act in which the
spouses can become ‘cooperators with God for giving life to a new person.’ These reasons
enable us to understand why the act of conjugal love is considered in the teaching of the
Church as the only setting worthy of human protection.” Id. (emphasis in original). The
instruction also objects to freezing embryos: “[t]he freezing of embryos, even when carried
out in order to preserve the life of an embryo cryopreservation constitutes an offence against
the respect due to human beings by exposing them to grave risks of death or harm to their
physical integrity and depriving them, at least temporarily, or maternal shelter and gestation,
thus placing them in a situation in which further offences and manipulation are possible.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
KATE M. OTT, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, A  T IM E TO BE BORN : A  FAITH-BASED GUIDE TO116
ASSISTED  REPROD UCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 19 (2009), available at http://www
.religiousinstitute.org/sites/default/files/study_guides/atimetobeborn.pdf. Nonetheless, social
conservative groups have not acted to oppose IVF entirely. See, e.g., Robin Toner, The
Vatican’s Doctrine: Political Impact; Contrast to Abortion Issue is Discerned, N.Y. T IM ES,
Mar. 12, 1987, at B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/12/us/the-vatican-s
-doctrine-political-impact-contrast-to-abortion-issue-is-discerned.html (contrasting the
absence of a “powerful consensus” among Catholics, fundamentalist and evangelical
Christians about surrogacy and test-tube fertilization with those groups’ opposition to
abortion).
ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, PANDORA’S BABY: HOW  THE FIRST TEST TUBE BABIES117
SPARKED THE REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION  70 (2004) (quoting Leon Kass, New Beginnings
in Life, in THE NEW  GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN  20–21 (Michael P. Hamilton ed.,
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 258–60.118
Mainstream Protestants (including the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church,
USA, the United Methodist Church, and the United Church of Christ), Jews and
Muslims have largely supported IVF, but more fundamentalist Protestants, including
the Southern Baptist Convention, recognize embryos as human lives and object to
excess embryos being discarded, frozen, or used for research purposes.   Leon116
Kass, the Chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics, de-
nounced reproductive and genetic research in 1972 as heralding “a new holy war
against human nature.”117
The result was blocked research funding at the federal level until President
Obama took office.  Not only did social conservative groups oppose funding for
embryonic stem cell research that would destroy embryos in the process of creating
a stem cell line, these groups thwarted funding for embryo research that might
enhance fertility.   The efforts started in the seventies almost immediately after Roe118
v. Wade legalized abortion and culminated in the “Dickey Amendment,” which has
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FUNDAMENTALS OF THE STEM  CELL DEBATE: THE SCIENTIFIC, RELIGIOUS, ETHICAL, AND
POLITICAL ISSUES 62, 74  (Monroe et al. eds., 2008).
Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 104th Cong., 110120
Stat. 26, 128 (1996). The 2005 version of the amendment provided that “None of the funds
made available in this Act may be used for . . .research in which a human embryo or embryos
are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that
allowed for research on fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and 42 U.S.C. 289g(b).”
Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. Appropriations Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-149, § 509,
109th Cong., 119 Stat. 2833, 2280 (2005).
Note, Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, 120 HARV. L. REV.121
574, 579 (2006). IVF clinics had little difficulty attracting private research funds, and in this
context, “caution was not a foremost concern, and few external forces existed to slow the
work of the clinic.” Id. at 587.
Robert J. Levine, Federal Funding and the Regulation of Embryonic Stem Cell122
Research: The Pontius Pilate Maneuver, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &  ETHICS 552, 561–62
(2009) (“Because insurance coverage for ART is quite limited, reimbursement requirements
fail to promote quality care.”).
John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction Industry,123
85 TEX. L. REV. 665, 674 (2007) (reviewing DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW
MONEY , SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COM MERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006)); see JESSICA
ARONS, CTR. FOR AM . PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW  8–11 (2007), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2007/12/pdf/future_choices_section1.pdf. California requires insurance coverage of
most treatments for infertility but excludes IVF procedures. See Cal. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 1374.55 (West 2000); Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 10119.6 (West 1993).
See ARONS, supra note 123, at 9.124
been attached to every Health and Human Services appropriations bill since 1996.119
The amendment forbids federal funding for “research in which a human embryo or
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death
. . . .”   Since much of the federal regulation of medicine involves controls on120
research spending, and since embryo research addresses the techniques most likely
to further assisted reproduction, reproductive research has taken place largely free
from public oversight, approval, or guidance.121
In addition, health insurance plans, which tend to favor more qualified doctors
and more tested procedures, and which may insist on greater transparency and
accountability,  rarely cover assisted reproduction.   A small number of states122 123
mandate health insurance coverage for assisted reproduction in plans that otherwise
cover reproductive services, but the courts have found that federal pension legisla-
tion preempts state law, limiting state mandates to smaller plans.   The combina-124
tion of limited insurance coverage with the lack of European style public subsidiza-
tion effectively limits access to assisted reproduction to wealthier and more sophisti-
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See Levine, supra note 122, at 562.125
The Harvard Law Review suggests that “the initially stronger connection between126
abortion and reproductive services—due to the use of embryos in IVF research—may have
created an early regulatory deadlock that unexpectedly accelerated the development and
broad availability of IVF. The strong public acceptance of IVF that ensued, coupled with an
entrenched economic force in the form of a private fertility industry, may have then solidified
the early deadlock into a long-term deregulatory norm that has persisted to this day.” Guiding
Regulatory Reform , supra note 121, at 584.
The United States Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42127
U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to 263a-7 (1994).
See, e.g., CAHN , supra note 5, at 56–59.128
See, e.g., Thailand Offers Less Expensive Fertility Treatment, Preimplantation Genetic129
Diagnosis, Attracting “Fertility Tourists,” MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Aug. 10, 2006, available
at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/49176.php.
Growing Generations Home Page, http://www.growinggenerations.com (last visited130
Jan. 30, 2010).
Surrogate Mom, Biological Dad Battle Over Triplets, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 1,131
cated patients, which in turn alleviates what might otherwise be greater pressure for
regulation.125
The ironic result of these forces has been the development of an industry of
willing patients and providers, selecting procedures in the context of small scale
private clinics.126
Within this deregulatory environment, the only significant piece of federal
legislation to date has been a reporting requirement; the United States Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 requires fertility clinics to report
success rates, albeit with no punitive sanctions for failure to disclose.   Fertility127
clinics are also required to comply with human tissue testing regulations concerning
the safety of donor gametes, which largely limits the participation of gay men as
donors.128
These developments have consequences for the shape of the industry.  First, the
lack of regulation has meant that fertility clinics can easily arrange for the delivery
of services that cross state, and sometimes international, lines.  Through internet
advertising and the development of affiliations, they can develop a larger market,
with the ability to refer prospective patients to friendlier legal jurisdictions if
necessary.   Growing Generations, for example, began in California as a surrogacy129
agency with services focused on the gay community; it now is affiliated with a
sperm bank and a law center, provides consultations in Australia and Britain, and
offers to meet with anyone, anywhere, through Skype.130
A controversial surrogacy case illustrates how such interstate transactions work.
A commissioning parent in Ohio (the 62-year-old chairman of the Math Department
at Cleveland State) secured the services of a Ohio clinic, which arranged for use of
the services of a gestational surrogate in Pennsylvania, and an egg donor from
Texas.   The subsequent litigation over custody of the resulting triplets created new131
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2005, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/05/01/Worldandnation/Surrogate_mom
__biolog.shtml.
J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873 (Ohio132
App. 9 Dist. 2006).
See Stephanie Nano, Most Fertility Clinics Break the Rules, Feb. 23, 2009, available133
at http://www.komonews.com/news/health/40089337.html. It also encourages the production
of extra embryos because the extraction of multiple eggs from the woman’s body makes
subsequent efforts less intrusive and expensive and because doctors have had more success
freezing embryos than unfertilized eggs.
American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Practice Comm. Reports, http://www134
.asrm.org/Media/Practice/practice.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
Robertson, supra note 123, at 684.135
Id. at 685.136
Infertility Coverage in Your State, RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association,137
http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_ic_stintro (last visited Jan. 15, 2010)
(noting fifteen states have laws requiring insurance coverage for infertility treatment).
law in Pennsylvania, which had neither statutory nor case law addressing the matter,
and a companion case about payment in Ohio.   Had the commissioning parent132
been unable to find a suitable clinic in Cleveland, it would have been a relatively
easy matter for him to secure one elsewhere.
Second, with private financing critical to fertility clinics and federally mandated
reporting of success rates important to patient choice, the desire to improve success
rates often drives accepted practices.  This has meant, for example, that American
clinics were slower than European clinics to reduce the number of embryos im-
planted.133
Third, with small scale clinics, private financing, and little public oversight, the
discussion of appropriate practices has also been limited.  The American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has promulgated ethical guidelines, but these
professional guidelines, which are voluntary in any event, do not necessarily receive
the same attention or enforcement as public oversight.   Texas Professor John134
Robertson observed the existence of “the moral dilemma that the need for legal
infrastructure presents to those loathe to accept ART in the first place.  Creating
infrastructure signals approval, legitimizes the practice, and encourages expansion
by reducing the planning costs of those engaging in it.”   While the absence of135
regulation has not been a barrier to “full-throated development of the field,”  it has136
meant that development of ethical understandings of the practices has been reserved
for the participants—to the extent it has occurred at all.
All of these factors, however, have begun to change.  Over the last decade, more
states have mandated insurance funding  and the number of couples undergoing137
fertility treatments has risen.  Some new procedures, such as preimplantation genetic
diagnosis, which allows testing for genetic traits and defects before implantation of
an embryo in a woman’s womb, have sparked new controversies and calls for
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REGISTER, Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2009/09/24/news/
d3-embryo3rd.txt.
CAHN , supra note 5, at 145–64.141
See id. ,at 167.142
See id.143
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Embryo and Gamete Disposition Laws,144
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14379 (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (detailing which
states had laws regarding embryos in 2007).
regulation.   In other cases, medical researchers question the wisdom of older138
techniques, particularly those that lead to risky multiple births.139
Moreover, the increase in the number of patients has in itself increased the
visibility of the practices, and awareness of fertility clinic abuses.  Embryo mix-ups,
for example, in which an embryo has been accidentally implanted in the wrong
woman have caused heart-rending, and often publicly riveting, dilemmas.   And140
everything about the solicitation of gamete donors, from the Ivy League ads seeking
women with high SAT scores, to the ubiquitous Craigslist postings seeking Asian
eggs, to the enterprising children tracing their supposed anonymous progenitors, has
generated public discussion and calls for oversight.141
Yet, the calls for oversight set the stage for a battle over the terms of engage-
ment.  Some oppose the very idea of IVF as an affront to the role of reproduction
within marriage and to the natural order and the dignity of the resulting child.142
Other groups see assisted reproduction as a way to circumvent the historic limita-
tions on non-marital reproduction, and to create a variety of families of choice.143
Even among those who favor assisted reproduction, no agreement exists on its
symbols or significance.  These disputes set the stage for the emergence of embryo
fundamentalism as a significant force not only in the national debate over ART, but
in the creation of the networks that will determine the future development of the
industry.  The determination of the largely unformed terms of these new practices
seems destined to take place on a battlefield defined by the most extreme and
irreconcilable of societal views.
IV. EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIVISM
The current round of embryo activism has been generated by the 2009 publicity
surrounding Nadya Suleman’s octuplets, although a few states had already enacted
legislation regulating the status of embryos.   The controversial births prompted144
legislative proposals in a number of states that have brought together moral absolut-
ism on the status of embryos, increased calls for regulatory oversight from the left
and the right, and helped the development of a movement to encourage embryo
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(George Washington Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 468, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1394046 [hereinafter Lawsky].
Nadya Suleman’s Fertility Doctor Under Scrutiny, Feb. 7, 2009, http://www146
.nbclosangeles.com/news/local-beat/Nadya-Sulemans-Fertility-Doctor-Under-Scrutiny.html.
Id.147
Id.148
Id.149
See Cahn & Collins, supra note 1 (providing an analysis of the response to Nadya150
Suleman).
Id. at 503.151
See infra notes 165–74.152
See John B. Krentel, The Louisiana “Human Embryo” Statute Revisited: Reasonable153
Recognition and Protection for the In Vitro Fertilized Ovum: Reproductive Technology and
the In Vitro Fertilized Ovum, 45 LOY . L. REV. 239 (1999).
transfers for reproductive purposes.   These proposals linked right-to-life/anti-145
abortion activists even more directly with reproductive technology issues.
Suleman, already a single mother of six, had six remaining embryos left over
from earlier IVF efforts and she and her doctor decided to implant all of them in
what they expected would be a last effort to produce additional children.   Al-146
though she was relatively young (33), the doctor had implanted six embryos in each
of her prior pregnancies, resulting in two sets of twins and two singleton births.147
Neither she nor her doctor believed that all six would develop, much less that two
of the embryos would split, producing octuplets.   Implanting six embryos,148
however, violated ASRAM guidelines, and the California Medical Board is investi-
gating the doctor’s practices to determine if there was “a violation of the standard
of care.”   Moreover, Suleman, as a divorced mother on disability living with her149
parents, has touched off denunciations in many circles by her use of IVF to have
fourteen children.   To many, on all sides of the ART issue, she stands as a dra-150
matic symbol of the unregulated nature of the industry.
The legislative proposals that have followed, however, reflect pre-existing
ideological positions more than pragmatic responses to the Suleman case.  No
legislature, for example, has adopted limits on the number of embryos to be im-
planted in spite of wide spread agreement that the doctor’s actions in implanting six
embryos in a young woman of proven fertility were inappropriate.   Instead, the151
proposals have used the Suleman controversy to stake out fundamentalist ap-
proaches to IVF, starting with Louisiana as an early role model,  and continuing152
with Georgia, Oklahoma, and other states’ efforts.
A. Louisiana
Louisiana became the first state to address the status of IVF embryos, adopting
comprehensive legislation in 1986.   At the time the Louisiana legislature passed153
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See Giovanna Breu & Frank Feldinger, In California, a Small Bundle of Medical156
History Arrives on Time: The First U.S. Frozen Embryo Baby, Archive, PEOPLE, June 23,
1986, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20093925,00.html.
Krentel, supra note 154, at 287.157
Krentel, supra note 153, at 240.158
Krentel, supra note 154, at 287.159
LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 479 (1983).160
Krentel, supra note 153, at 242–43. Krentel observes, “Because of the potential for161
development into a full human person, the Louisiana legislature determined that this entity
is deserving of special consideration, respect, and legal recognition as a juridical person.
Furthermore, the legislature also impliedly found that the fertilized ovum is not yet ready for
full recognition as a natural person. In Louisiana, the rights and privileges appertaining to
a natural person do not flow to the in vitro fertilized ovum, but certain rights are ascribed to
this unique extra-corporeal biological being: the right to life, the right to protection from
harm, the right to counsel, and the right to be adopted.” Id. (citations omitted).
Krentel, supra note 154, at 287.162
the measures, the Reagan coalition had emerged nationally.  Louisiana, however,
has long combined conservative Southern politics with an influential Catholic
constituency, and the Louisiana legislation reflected state forces.
The legislation originated with John Krentel’s article in the Louisiana Bar
Journal in 1985, an article he wrote while he was still at Loyola Law School.   He154
published the article three years after the birth of the first IVF baby in the United
States, and did so as IVF clinics were still getting off the ground in Louisiana.155
The first baby born in the United States from a frozen embryo would not occur until
after the article was published;  Krentel reports that Louisiana practice at the time156
was to implant all embryos created.   Krentel further writes that the nascent157
industry lobbied for the legislation, and that “the medical specialists specifically
requested that the legislature define the required medical qualifications for the
practice of reproductive medicine with regard to the fertilization, implantation, and
storage of fertilized embryos.”158
Nonetheless, the statute’s principal innovation was its attempt to define embryos
as human life, and to construct a legal infrastructure for their disposition consistent
with that definition.  Krentel reasoned that “a state has the sovereign power to create
juridical identities,”  a term previously used to describe corporations,  and that159 160
it represented a middle ground acknowledging the humanity of the embryo, but
stopping short of granting it the full personhood of a “natural” person.   Krentel,161
however, insisted on recognition of “the essential equality of all human beings.”162
He observed, “[w]hile the Supreme Court may be incapable of embracing this
fundamental premise, nonetheless those health care providers involved in in vitro
2010] EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM 27
Id.163
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 9:123 (2009).164
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . §  9:122  (2009).165
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 9:124 (2009).166
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . §  9:126  (2009).167
Id.168
Id.169
Id.170
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 9:130 (2009).171
Id.172
fertilization services ought to strongly consider this maxim,”  and the new statute163
sought to compel them to do so.
The statute directly addressed embryo status, providing that, “An in vitro
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as the in vitro
fertilized ovum is implanted in the womb; or at any other time when rights attach
to an unborn child in accordance with law.”   By limiting the statute’s reach to the164
period between fertilization and implantation, the statute avoided conflict with a
woman’s bodily integrity and the Supreme Court decisions recognizing a woman’s
right to terminate an embryo during the early stages of pregnancy.  The statute
emphasized further that “[th]e use of a human ovum fertilized in vitro is solely for
the support and contribution of the complete development of human in utero implan-
tation.”   Sale or creation for other purposes is expressly prohibited.165 166
The statute thus precluded the creation of embryos for stem cell or other re-
search even though stem cell research was not on the horizon in the mid-eighties.
The statute rejected the idea that an embryo could be regarded as property or could
be destroyed.   Instead, it took pains to recognize the cells as children with “par-167
ents.”   The statute states that if the progenitors express their identity, “then their168
rights as parents as provided under the Louisiana Civil Code will be preserved.”169
If not, the physician would become a “temporary guardian” until “adoptive implan-
tation can occur.”   The court also has the power to appoint a curator to protect the170
embryo’s rights.  These provisions, while treating the embryo as similar to a child,
stop short of requiring progenitors to implant them.  The statute nonetheless speci-
fies that the embryos are owed a “high duty of care”  and that if the patients171
renounce their parental rights “by notarial act,”172
then the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be available for
adoptive implantation . . . .  The in vitro fertilization patients
may renounce their parental rights in favor of another married
couple, but only if the other couple is willing and able to receive
the in vitro fertilized ovum. . . .  Constructive fulfillment of the
statutory provisions for adoption in this state shall occur when
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“[O]ne IVF-cryopreservation clinic in the state donates all spare embryos but has174
confronted a dilemma in that, at least in the first few months of operation, more couples want
to donate than receive spare embryos.” ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN , IN V ITRO FERTILIZATION:
BUILDING POLICY FROM  LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 96 (1989).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . §  9:130  (2009).175
LA. REV. STAT. ANN . § 9:131 (2009).176
See discussion supra pp 7–8.177
Louisiana law also limits the liability of the clinics involved in the transfer of embryos178
to “the human uterus” and deals with inheritance rights. LA. REV. STAT. ANN . §§ 9:132–133
(2009).
See, e.g., Sarah A. Weber, Comment, Dismantling the Dictated Moral Code:179
Modifying Louisiana’s In Vitro Fertilization Statutes to Protect Patients’ Procreative
Liberty, 51 LOY . L. REV. 549 (2005).
The Fertility Institute in New Orleans already has 7000 preembryos in storage,180
including ones that have been there since the late 1980s. Glaser, supra note 10.
See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that parents could181
use replevin to recover embryos in Virginia that they wanted to transfer to a different clinic
in California.) A Louisiana court could conceivably find, however, that the best interests of
the embryo preclude transfer if the parents still live in Louisiana and wish to transfer them
out of state to destroy them or to evade the protections of Louisiana law and the statute
arguably grants the court jurisdiction to appoint a conservator even in cases in which the
a married couple executes a notarial act of adoption of the in
vitro fertilized ovum and birth occurs.173
This section provided for embryo donation for reproductive purposes well before the
idea took hold elsewhere.   It facilitates embryo transfer by providing for the pre-174
birth termination of the progenitors’ parental rights, and establishing the donees’
parental status without formal adoption procedures such as a home study.   It175
accordingly resolves doubts about the resulting child’s identity and parentage.
Moreover, the statute directed that any dispute would be resolved in accordance with
“the best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum.”   This section appears to provide176
for implantation of the embryo in the event of a dispute between progenitors who
divorce, in light of its articulation of a “best interest” standard.  The result would
directly contradict the decisions in other states, but no cases appear to have arisen
to date.   The statute does not address the validity of contracts providing for the177
disposition of frozen embryos, but its use of a best interest standard to resolve
disputes suggests that third parties cannot contract around the statutory provisions
any more than parents can use contracts adversely to a child’s interests.178
The constitutionality of the Louisiana statute has never been tested, although it
has certainly been subject to critique.   It stops short of requiring that the progeni-179
tors implant all of the embryos they create or make them available for adoption.
While it precludes destruction, it would not appear to prevent the indefinite storage
of frozen embryos  or to bar transfer out of state.   So long as they remain in180 181
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See H.B. 388, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009).184
See S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced); H.B. 388,185
150th Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).
S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009). A version of this bill that did not186
define an embryo as a human being was passed by the Senate and as of January 15, 2010 has
yet to be voted on by the House. For further discussion of the legislation, see generally
Lawsky & Cahn, supra note 145.
H.B. 388, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).187
Audrey Barrick, Ga. House Passes Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Bill, CHRISTIAN188
POST, Apr. 4, 2009, available at http://www.christianpost.com/Society/Ethics_rights/2009/
Louisiana, however, embryos merit the protection of the state.  Indeed, during the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the governor of Louisiana personally oversaw
rescue efforts of frozen embryos in the freezers of New Orleans hospitals.182
B. Georgia
If the Louisiana legislation dates back to the beginning of IVF in the United
States, the Georgia legislation is a direct response to the publicity surrounding
Nadya Suleman’s octuplets.   Rep. James Mills, a longstanding abortion foe,183
introduced the “Option of Adoption Act” as part of a set of bills that constituted an
anti-abortion response to Suleman.   These bills had a variety of objectives:184
adopting language that systematically recognizes embryos as human life from the
moment of conception, facilitating embryo transfer for reproductive purposes,
limiting stem cell research in the state, and more closely regulating IVF.   The185
resulting legislation, however, jettisoned the provisions that would have had the
greatest impact on the well-established Georgia fertility industry and focused on the
procedures necessary to facilitate embryo donation for reproductive purposes.
The rhetoric in the initial bills crafted a right-to-life approach.  The proposed
“Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act” would have amended the chapter of the
Georgia Code relating to the parent-child relationship to define an embryo as a
“biological human being who is not the property of any person or entity.”186
Similarly, the initial version of the “Option of Adoption Act” would have amended
the definition of “child” for purposes of the Georgia adoption statute, so that “child”
meant not only “a person who is under 18 years of age and who is sought to be
adopted,” but also “a human embryo.”187
The proposed legislation received strong support from Georgia Right to Life,
an anti-abortion group, viewing them as part of an effort to “establis[] personhood
for the pre-born.”188
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O.C.G.A. § 19-8-41(d) (2009).190
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See June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult192
Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 341, 393–94 (2006).
S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).193
Press Release, RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association, RESOLVE: The194
National Infertility Association and Supporters Defeat Dangerous Georgia Bill (Apr. 9,
2009), available at http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=fmed_mccpr040809.
The final version of the Option of Adoption Act did not, however, redefine
“child” to include human embryos.  Instead, the legislation amends the Georgia
Code to add a new article that allows the progenitors to “relinquish all rights and
responsibilities for an embryo to a recipient intended parent” before transfer of the
embryo.   The act states that:189
A child born to a recipient intended parent as the result of em-
bryo relinquishment pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code
section shall be presumed to be the legal child of the recipient
intended parent; provided that each legal embryo custodian and
each recipient intended parent has entered into a written con-
tract.190
This provision seems to work much like the marital presumption in traditional
family law and creates a presumption that the birth mother and her husband are
parents without further action.  Another provision of the Georgia code, however,
authorizes the intended parents to petition the courts before or after the child’s birth
for an expedited order of “adoption or parentage.”   The court order, which can be191
issued by a court with jurisdiction over adoption, provides greater protection for
prospective parents and greater likelihood of interstate recognition should parentage
be contested in another jurisdiction.   Unlike the legal procedures available to192
adoption, the statute effectively authorizes a transfer of parental rights before birth
and without the home study that would be ordinarily required in an adoption.
Georgia also considered legislation last spring (2009) that would have estab-
lished (a) limits on the number of eggs that could be fertilized; (b) limits on the
number of embryos that a doctor could transfer; (c) a ban on freezing embryos, and
(d) a ban on payment for donor egg, sperm and embryo.   RESOLVE, the national193
infertility advocacy group, was able to help generate almost 100,000 contacts to the
state legislature to prevent enactment of the legislation.   The Georgia fertility194
industry successfully argued that such restrictions would simply drive fertility
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patients out-of-state.   The legislation that passed in Georgia, by contrast, staked195
out a more fundamentalist position on the status of embryos without directly
affecting fertility clinic practice in the state; the only legislation to take effect
facilitated embryo transfers without the inflammatory rhetoric that dominated press
coverage.   Even then, its sponsors encouraged the headlines celebrating the act as196
the “nation’s first embryo adoption bill” despite the fact that legislation existed in
states as varied as California, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Florida authorizing the
practice.197
C. Other States: From Oklahoma to California
Oklahoma has also passed legislation facilitating embryo transfers for reproduc-
tive purposes.   The legislation treats the resulting child as the child of the “hus-198
band and wife desiring to receive” so long as the donor husband and wife and the
recipients sign written agreements to that effect.   The statute requires the physi-199
cian performing the procedure to file the written consents with the court, and the
recipients’ consent must be “executed and acknowledged” by “any judge of a court
having adoption jurisdiction in this state.”   The legislation further provides that200
an embryo transfer is not “trafficking in children” so long as there is no sale in-
volved.201
In 2009, Tennessee considered legislation that would have provided the
protections of a formal adoption to those who used donated embryos, although it did
not require formal court approval in order for the embryo exchange to proceed.202
Some of the entities that strongly supported the Tennessee legislation were the
Tennessee Eagle Forum  and FACT,  which defines its mission as a belief that203 204
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“healthy families and communities come about when basic values from the Bible are
embraced and upheld.  Neglecting commonsense biblical values contributes to many
of our nation’s current ills like crime, disease, divorce, ‘unwanted’ pregnancies, teen
suicide and academic failure.”205
In other states, there have been movements to support “personhood” initiatives
that accord personhood status to embryos.   A Nevada judge in early 2010 struck206
down an attempt to bring such an initiative to a vote.   As attorneys opposing the207
initiative explained, it would have had implications for reproductive technology as
well as abortion.208
A number of states, however, have provisions that facilitate embryo transfer as
part of a comprehensive approach to assisted reproduction.  California, for example,
in creating a legal infrastructure designed to encourage stem cell research passed
legislation in 2002 requiring fertility clinics to provide patients with a complete list
of embryo disposition options.   These options include destruction and donation209
for research or reproductive purposes.   The Texas Uniform Parentage Act pro-210
vides for embryo donation as part of its regulation of parenthood in the context of
a variety of techniques.   The Act requires a married women and her husband to211
consent in writing to establish parenthood,  and recognizes the woman who gives212
birth as the legal mother unless there has been a legal proceeding recognizing
someone else.   The Florida Parentage Act similarly terminates the parental status213
of the donors  and provides that, with the exception of gestational surrogacy, “any214
child born within wedlock who has been conceived by means of donated eggs or
preembryos shall be irrebuttably presumed to be the child of the recipient gestating
woman and her husband, provided that both parties have consented in writing to the
use of donated eggs or preembryos.”215
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The California, Florida and Texas statutes, which were passed in the context of
systematic oversight of ART, address embryo donation without all of the political
posturing of embryo fundamentalists.  To be sure, the Florida and Texas provisions
limit the process to husbands and wives,  but in none of these states was the216
support for embryo donation to infertile couples particularly controversial.217
Indeed, even in Louisiana, the industry did not oppose the legislation that defined
embryos as “juridical persons” because the statute effectively provided legislative
sanction for the potentially controversial practice of IVF at an early stage in its
development.218
The relatively recent Georgia statute, in contrast, could be hailed as the nation’s
first “embryo adoption” law precisely because it eschewed the language of donation
for adoption.  Although as a practical matter, the statute operates in similar legal
terms to parentage statutes elsewhere, the right to life press hailed use of the term
“legal embryo custodian” to replaces “embryo donor” throughout Georgia’s new
code as though it were a critical innovation.   Whatever happens to assisted219
reproduction in practice, the war of words is likely to continue.
V. EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE POLITICS OF PURITY
Janet Dolgin identified the critical development in the right-to-life movement
of the last two decades as its shift from a movement in rebellion against the chang-
ing status of women to one focused on fetal and embryonic status.   This shift220
occurred as a part of a more general political realignment that has given greater
voice to the most authoritarian, hierarchical and uncompromising voices in the
American political spectrum, and as the Republican party considers an ideological
purity test as a basis for party support.   Abortion politics has gained appeal in this221
context precisely because of its claim to moral clarity and its resistance to compro-
mise.
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The move to greater insistence on ideological purity, however, also gives rise
to a dilemma.  While fealty to the pro-life cause has locked in a conservative base
of support, extension of the same principles more generally—to stem cell research,
embryo freezing, IVF—risks alienating a significant part of the electorate.   The222
result has been a preference for rhetoric over action.  Introducing pro-life bills
designed to fail, holding efforts to ban reproductive cloning (which relatively few
want) hostage to efforts to prohibit therapeutic cloning (which the majority sup-
ports), defining embryos as “juridical persons” without interfering with fertility
practices allows the voices of purity to rally the base without producing the type of
backlash that marginalizes the cause.
The result has produced legislative gridlock over the regulation of assisted
reproductive.  Pragmatic oversight, such as the California legislation authorizing
embryo donation,  risks granting official approval to controversial practices and223
such legislation has been relatively rare.   At the same time, the fertility industry224
has flourished and has enough clout to block Georgia’s efforts to grant too much
standing to embryos or to limit ethically questionable practices such as the implanta-
tion of multiple embryos in an apparently fertile thirty-three-year old.225
As the industry has taken hold, however, the calls for legal reform grow louder.
Some center on greater oversight of industry practices.   The most basic address226
the issues of parentage.  Embryo donation, like gamete donation before it, is risky
without certainty about parental status.  Prospective adoptive parents have been
traumatized by the fear that birth parents will change their mind before an adoption
is complete.   Carrying a child to term only to enter into a fight over the child’s227
future would be heart rending.  Just as legislative sanction has encouraged the
growth of egg and sperm donation, so, too, does embryo donation benefit from a
legal infrastructure authorizing the practice and providing certainty about the
resulting parental status.  And there seems to be relatively little opposition to the
practice so long as it arises between consenting donors and recipients.
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The issue instead is one of ideological purity: will embryo donations become
simply one more arena for the construction of the meaning of reproduction, and will
it be done on terms that advance one view to the exclusion of others?
A. The Stakes
If abortion rose to prominence as a political flash point because of its association
with the modern family at the expense of traditional ones, so too is assisted repro-
duction associated with modernity and the technological manipulation of the sacred
(the production of a child) to serve individualistic ends.  The Catholic Church
emphasizes exactly this perspective in its opposition to IVF.   At the same time,228
of course, traditional women see fulfillment in terms of their roles as wives and
mothers, and infertility thus affects them profoundly.  As the age of marriage rises
across the United States,  the interest in assisted reproduction is likely to increase229
as well.  The question will then become on what terms.
Kristin Luker’s characterization of the abortion debate provides a clue as to how
the battle lines are likely to be drawn.  She observed that:
Women who oppose abortion and seek to make it officially
unavailable are declaring, both practically and symbolically, that
women’s reproductive roles should be given social primacy . .
. .  when personhood is bestowed on the embryo, women’s
nonreproductive roles are made secondary to their reproductive
roles.230
Underlying this description is not just the recreation of the gender role fights of the
eighties, but of the idea of agency that underlay them.  For traditional women,
reproduction is something that follows from sexuality and imposes order on family
life.  For modern, women, it is something to be chosen and managed.
Applying these same ideas to embryo donation changes the terms of the debate.
For modern women, IVF allows older women to determine the terms of reproduc-
tion, to go forward with gametes they choose, to control the timing of the process.231
While infertility treatments are costly, painful and emotionally draining,  they are232
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also tied to a determination to produce a certain kind of family, even if the meaning
of that family differs from one person to the next.  Embryo donation, in contrast, can
be reconciled with the idea of submission to God’s will.  It can be thought of in
terms of obligation rather than choice, of a fated match between parents and child
rather than a managed one.  In practical terms, it may be less expensive than new
rounds of IVF and it can be reconciled even with religious beliefs opposed to IVF
itself.   The growth of embryo donation thus opens the door to new meanings for233
assisted reproduction, for the benefit of new constituencies, who increase the
demand for different laws.
This in turn may increase the fight to control the meanings of the resulting
legislation.
B. The Laws
The conflict between the ideals underlying ART—individualism, technological
sophistication, gender equality, determination to produce the best possible chil-
dren—and the emerging ideals underlying embryo adoption is greatest at the
symbolic level.  Moreover, the clash between the two ideals is not parallel.  Pro-
choice states such as California actively facilitate embryo transfers  while pro-life234
states such as Georgia hail its “embryo adoption” legislation because it addresses
IVF only in pro-life terms.   As embryo fundamentalists seek more influence, ART235
regulation might proceed in multiple, potentially overlapping or potentially
exclusionary, directions, which we briefly outline below.
1. Segregated Networks
First, it is entirely possible that new legislation will facilitate further develop-
ment of separate networks for the provision of fertility services, with radically
different moral and ethical views about ART.  Clinics with fundamentally different
philosophies currently exist in California.  One need only compare Rainbow Flag
Health Services (on the web as www.gayspermbank.com)  in Oakland, CA with236
Nightlight Christian Adoptions in Anaheim, CA.   Rainbow Flag affirmatively237
reaches out to the gay and lesbian community,  while Nightlight Christian Adop-238
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tions is deeply rooted in a more conservative Christian outlook that focuses on
married couples as its primary constituency.239
Second, regulation might facilitate fertility tourism.  If states create distinctly
different background laws, encouraging donation for research in some states (Cali-
fornia) and donation for reproduction in others, subsidizing some programs and
harassing or limiting others, the net result may be specialized networks by state.
California already has clinics that cater to foreign fertility tourists seeking a more
supportive legal environment;  Americans might choose the clinic of their choice240
based on the state’s legal infrastructure.
Fertility tourism is already possible, of course, and India has become a desirable
international destination.   Today’s world, which involves widespread availability241
and negligible oversight for those who can afford fertility services may continue,
perhaps with new clinics becoming even less likely to open in hostile states; con-
versely, national legislation forbidding embryo destruction could limit the practical
differences among states.
Third, there may be practical convergence.  To date, evangelicals have been less
likely to use IVF, partly because of the expense and partly because of younger
average ages of childbearing.   If embryo adoption were to become more wide-242
spread, it might create new constituencies for IVF itself.  Even though some reli-
gions oppose IVF altogether, most Protestant denominations do not yet have fully
developed views on the subject.   Embryo adoption, which remains unusual today,243
might become a more common response to infertility, and ultimately increase
support for ART more generally.
The Louisiana  and Georgia  statutes discussed above provide some evidence244 245
of convergence as well ideological posturing.  In Louisiana, the industry effectively
accepted recognition of the special status of embryos as the price of approval for
state authorization of IVF.   In Georgia, on the other hand, the pro-life forces246
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dropped the more extreme language on the status of embryos in order to enact
legislation providing for embryo adoption, with the symbolically important authori-
zation of parentage decrees from adoption courts.   The result in both states has247
been greater legal clarity that makes embryo transfers more likely.
2. Constitutional Clashes?
The laws that have been adopted to date appear to stop short of direct conflict
with established IVF practices or the kind of infringement on reproductive auton-
omy that would prompt litigation.  Even the limitations in statutes like those in
Texas  and Florida  limiting embryo adoption to a “husband and wife” have not248 249
been tested.  Nonetheless, such prohibitions on access to reproductive services based
on marital status might run afoul of some existing state civil rights laws, and may
be unconstitutional under the federal constitution. compel a judicial response.250
Attempts to limit reproductive liberties would become more likely to be challenged
if they:251
a) Mandated implantation of all embryos, even over the objections of the
progenitors.  Such a requirement would be inconsistent with existing
state cases on the disposition of extra embryos in contexts in which
husbands and wives have disagreed, and appear inconsistent with older
Supreme Court cases such as Skinner v. Oklahoma  and more recent252
decisions in the abortion context.  Requiring progenitors who will not
or cannot implant their embryos to allow others to do so would clearly
intrude on reproductive autonomy.  Conversely, if a state were to
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provide notice to progenitors at the time they create the embryos that
the state will favor implantation in the event of a dispute between the
progenitors, then the provision of notice might effect the constitutional
argument, at least where one of the progenitors wishes to produce a
child.  At the same time, the retroactive application of such laws to
couples who signed agreements to the contrary before the legislation
was passed may also raise constitutional issues about procedural, as
well as substantive, due process.
b) Prohibit the creation of extra embryos.  The potential enactment of
statutes modeled after those in Italy, which limits the number of em-
bryos creates and requires couples to implant all of the embryos they
create,  raises various constitutional issues.  To date, the debate has253
centered around the existence of a constitutionally guaranteed right to
procreation.  As the debate between John Robertson and Radhika Rao254
shows, the precise contours of such a right have yet to be articulated.
Such a law could result in extensive litigation, and the outcome might
depend on whether:
• The U.S. Supreme Court would intervene in the issue at all or leave
the matter to the states.  The most recent abortion cases indicate a
high degree of deference to state legislatures, and the court might
decide that the determination of embryo status rests with the states,
at least where it applies to the determination of an embryo’s status
outside of the human body that poses no direct conflict with an-
other person’s bodily integrity.255
• The legislation justifies a limit on the number of embryos created
based solely on the moral status of the embryo irrespective of the
individual patient’s circumstances, or permits consideration of
other factors such as the patient’s health, age, or the likelihood of
reproductive success.
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• The legislation ties determination of the number of embryos that
can be created to the number to be implanted.  Doctors could easily
circumvent restrictions by implanting embryos at a time or under
circumstances unlikely to lead to pregnancy.
c) Progenitor criminal liability for the destruction of embryos.  The status
of a law that required all progenitors who object to implantation of their
embryos to keep them frozen indefinitely raises a complex series of
issues.  Many couples undergoing fertility treatments do not want more
than a certain number of children and would object vehemently to their
genetic offspring being raised by someone else.  Consistent with the
special respect they might accord their potential children, they may well
object to indefinite storage of the embryos.  The question of what
deference the state owes the views of such progenitors, which may
reflect the progenitors’ individual religious or ethical views, is an
unexplored issue underlying the debate.  A criminal prosecution for
“pulling the plug” on a freezer or taking embryos out of state for thaw-
ing and disposal would squarely present the issues; a request to a
Louisiana court to enjoin interference for plans to thaw and bury em-
bryos might raise similar issues.
d) Rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose: A state regulation
requiring the indefinite storage of frozen embryos over the objections
of the progenitors may be challenged on the ground that it lacks a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.   Conversely, a state256
law prohibiting the transfer of frozen embryos out of state or to jurisdic-
tions that permit their destruction may violate the right to travel.
CONCLUSION
If reproductive technology is to move forward, then the political conundrum for
the future of embryo regulation is determining the rights of embryo progenitors and
recipients.  If the embryo is a child, then adoption laws apply, but those laws
ordinarily allow progenitors to change their mind after the child’s birth and require
adoptive parents to submit to a home study by the state.  As California demonstrates,
however, it is possible to reach agreement on a legal infrastructure that allows
embryo transfers to go forward without resolving global disagreements on embryo
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status.   The question is whether that will be enough for those invested in the257
ideological rhetoric of abortion politics.
